Abstract-Unlike cases where only a single failure occurs, fault detection and isolation of multiple sensor and actuator failures for engines are diflicult to achieve because of the interactive effects of the failed components. If faults all appear either in sensors only or in actuators only, many existing residual generators which provide decoupled residual signals can be employed directly to obtain proper fault detection and isolation. However, when both sensor and actuator failures occur at the same time, their mutual effects on residuals make fault isolation particularly difficult. Under such circumstances, further decision logic is required. In this paper, we propose a hexadecimal decision table to relate all possible failure patterns to the residual code. The residual code is obtained through simple threshold testing of the residuals, which are the output of a general scheme of residual generators. The proposed diagnostic system incorporating the hexadecimal decision table has been successfully applied to automotive engine sensors and actuators in both simulation and experimental analyses. Enhancement of the present diagnostic performance by implementing an additional sensor is also described.
I. INTRODUCTION
N COMPLEX automatic control systems safety and relia-I bility are crucial. These are especially important in safetycritical cases such as nuclear power plants, aircraft, space vehicles, and processes that involve the handling of dangerous chemicals. If any failure occurs in such systems, it may lead to serious economic loss or hazards to personnel. Consequently, there is a need for a monitoring scheme that performs the tasks of failure detection, isolation, and accommodation. Various diagnostic systems have been proposed and analyzed [ 11- [5] . In these systems, failure detection and isolation (FDI) are generally achieved in two stages: 1) residual generation and 2) decision making. The first stage generates a set of failuresensitive signals called the residuals; the second stage detects and isolates the failures according to the characteristics of the residuals.
With the increasing application of electronically controlled engines in the automotive industry, fault diagnosis in automotive systems has become an important research and development topic. Several approaches have been reported to successfully detect and isolate either sensor or actuator failures, i.e., single failure occurrences, in automotive engines [6]- [8] . In practice, however, multiple failures in sensors, actuators, or both sensors and actuators may exist, making available diagnostic methods fail. Thus, a more powerful diagnostic system designed to cope with multiple failures is required. To localize the multiple sensor and actuator failures uniquely as they occur in a dynamic system, one needs, in general, a bank of observers rather than a single observer. Fault detection schemes with multiple Kalman filters have been developed for identifying multiple failures [9] -[ 111. Furthermore, the dedicated observer scheme (DOS) has been applied to fault detection for multiple fault occurrences by using a bank of Luenberger observers [12], [13] , where each instrument of interest drives an observer to perform a complete state estimation. Two restrictions arise in this type of multiple observer-based FDI scheme. First, since each observer in the scheme is driven by only one instrument output, the states of the plant should be completely observable through each instrument, and this does not always hold in practice. The second limitation in the DOS is that only a single failure is admitted at a single instant; that is, multiple failures occurring simultaneously in both sensors and actuators are difficult to identify. Therefore, extensions of diagnostic observer design for residual structure enhancement and further decision logic are necessary.
In this paper, we first synthesize a set of residual generators to construct a general scheme for multiple fault diagnosis. When all failures occur either in sensors or in actuators, the well-decoupled output residuals can be used directly for fault isolation. However, when multiple failures occur simultaneously in both sensors and actuators, fault isolation cannot be achieved merely by checking the residual outputs directly because of the interactive effects of the failed components. Therefore, a powerful approach involving a hexadecimal decision table is proposed here for further decision making. Both simulation and experimental results show that the present diagnostic system can effectively identify multiple sensor and actuator failures in engine systems.
11. A GENERAL SCHEME FOR RESIDUAL GENERATORS For multiple failure diagnosis, synthesis of a set of modelbased residual generators is commonly employed. In this paper, all faults of the dynamic system that need to be monitored are first assumed to occur in the same sector, either sensors or actuators. Then, a hexadecimal decision table is proposed to identify simultaneous faults in both sensors and actuators.
Consider a minimal state-space realization of the discretetime plant model given by the following equations 
where z ( k ) E R" is the state vector, u ( k ) E Rp is the input vector, y(k) E R" is the measurement output vector, and
consists of faults which may occur in the actuators, the plant dynamics (components), or the sensors. System parameters A , B, C, D , E, and F are constant matrices with appropriate dimensions. The initial state x ( 0 ) is assumed to be zero. Taking the z-transformation of (l)- (2) gives where
A residual generator can be expressed in a general form as PI, ~4 1 with the properties that for all u ( z ) ,
ii
where F ( z ) and H ( z ) are stable and proper transfer matrices that are realizable in a real system. When no failure occurs, all the residuals are equal or close to zero. In the presence of the i-th failure signal, the i-th residual signal will become distinguishably nonzero. Therefore, the fault may be detected and isolated by observing the residuals. By substituting (3) into (6), we can rewrite the residual vector T as
To generate the residual vector T with the properties described in (7)-@), F ( z ) and H ( z ) must satisfy the following conditions i) F ( z ) and H ( z ) are both stable and proper, and
Condition i) implies that the dynamic system of the residual generator is stable, so that its undesired initial states will approach zero. Condition ii) ensures that ~( z )
will be independent of input u(z). Moreover, the desired residual map between faults and residuals in the design for real applications may be specified as M ( z ) . Thus, the following condition may be also satisfied
( 1 1) where
where R[z] is the ring of polynomials in z with real coefficients and poles of C-within the unit circle. Equation (11) indicates that the map M ( z ) ,
is decoupled in order to identify different faults [15] , [16] . There are many published methods that can be adopted to obtain the residual signals; as reported in [5] , different approaches selected according to the preference of researchers or for different purposes may lead to identical design results. For example, the M ( z ) of a fault identification filter (FIDF) [17] can be selected so as to obtain moving average forms for F ( z ) and H ( z ) in deadbeat responses to yield the parity space equations.
When faults occur in both sensors and actuators, as shown in Fig. 1 , U ( k ) and y(k) correspond to the actual input and output of the plant, respectively, and u ( k ) and y(k) represent the desired input and measured output. The actuator and sensor failures are represented by a ( k ) and s ( k ) , respectively. Thus, we have the following equations
where s ( k ) is a time-varying vector with element s ; ( k ) representing the failure signal of the i-th sensor. Several failure modes of the i-th sensor can be modeled by choosing s i ( k ) properly. For instance, if the i-th sensor completely fails, producing zero output, then s ; ( k ) = -y;(k); if there is a bias error b; appearing in the i-th sensor, then d i ( k ) = b;. The actuator failures a ( k ) can be modeled in the same way [18] . Note that U ( k ) and y ( k ) are "internal" variables which are inaccessible. Therefore, we need to further combine (1 3) and (14) with the nominal plant model so that the state equations are explicitly expressed by the external variables u ( k ) and y(k). Thus, we obtain
where a ( k ) E Rp is the actuator failure vector and s ( k ) E R" is the sensor failure vector. Also. we have (17) where
The corresponding terms with the subscripts "s" and "a" in the following equations are designed with respect to sensor and actuator failures, respectively. To detect and isolate multiple sensor and actuator failures, a general scheme is proposed here to generate a set of residuals for decision making. Note that for a diagnostic system, the number of sensors used to extract failure information is usually greater than the number of actuators. Therefore, only cases where m 2 p are discussed in this paper. Different residual generators can be designed separately for sensors and actuators as described below. 
A. Residual Generators for Sensor Failure Detection
To design residual generators specifically for sensor failure detection, we obtain H,(z) and F,(z) by choosing any
and Then, we have Equation (20) indicates that if only sensor faults occur, i.e., u ( z ) = 0, all multiple sensor failures can be detected by examining the residuals directly. However, when sensor and actuator fail simultaneously, both the sensor failure and actuator failure will contribute to the residual outputs specifically designed for sensors, as shown in (20). Thus, further decision making is required for the signals from these residual generators.
B. Residual Generators for Actuator Failure Detection
In electronically controlled engines, the number of sensors, such as manifold pressure, engine RPM, temperature, and other sensors, is usually greater than the number of actuators, such as throttle angle and fuel injection actuators. Consequently, m 2 p and we can construct more than one residual generator (up to Cp" ones) for actuator failure isolation, so that more Also, by choosing M;')(z) for a desirable set of residual generators for actuators, we obtain
and
, L k ( z ) s ( ' ) (~) ) . (24)
Also, the sensor faults will all affect the output of the residual generators that are designed specifically for actuators. As a result, the designed residual generators will be invalid when simultaneous sensor and actuator failures occur. As shown in both (20) and (24), failures can be isolated directly by observing T , and T , only when actuator and sensor failures do not occur simultaneously. However, if failures occur in both the sensors and actuators, the interaction between faulty sensors and faulty actuators will obscure the direct relationships between failures and residuals in the present scheme. Under such circumstances, a powerful decision logic is required for fault isolation if we are to distinguish different failure conditions. In the general scheme of residual generators, the same test is applied to all residuals to obtain all flags &) as follows where 1 I * I I denotes a measure of magnitude (either in the time domain or in the frequency domain) and J,, and Jifi) denote the corresponding threshold values for sensor residuals and actuator residuals, respectively.
HEXADECIMAL DECISION
These flags are obtained based on the relationships between the residuals and fault sources. Thus, the flags can be combined as a new representation for various failure conditions to form residual codes in hexadecimal digits. Accordingly, we construct a hexadecimal decision table and apply it to decision making. We illustrate our approach by the following two ideal examples:
In this example, the scheme of residual generators is as shown in Fig. 3 . When no faults occur in the sensors and actuators, the effects of all residuals on all flags should be insignificant. If a fault occurs and the magnitude of a residual is greater than a certain threshold value, the corresponding flag t should be set to 1; otherwise, it should be set to 0. When the corresponding transfer functions G;'(z) in (24) are not zero over the frequency range in which the power of the failure signal is concentrated, the relationships between failures and residuals in this 2-input-2-output case can be described as shown in Table I. For example, the first row (1,1,1,0) means that &, is influenced by ( a l , a2, sl) but is independent of s2; the first column nonzero but has no effect on Ea,. Similar interpretations can be applied to the other columns and rows. With a valid cause-effect table, we can list all possible combinations of failure conditions and the corresponding residual patterns. For example, if we use 1's and 0's to denote "fault" and "no fault," respectively, then there are four types of possible failure conditions of the two actuators {al,a2} : (00), ( O l ) , (lo) , and (11). 
The same argument can be applied to the sensor failure conditions. For example, (SI, s2, a l , u2) = (0010) represents the condition where actuator a1 has failed. By putting the residual flags into an ordered pair (tsl, I,,, Ea Table 11 . In the hexadecimal decision table, the row elements are the actuator failure conditions and the column elements are the sensor failure conditions. According to Table 11 , partial failure conditions, which are located in the upper-left-hand part of the table, can be detected and isolated successfully. If different failure conditions are represented by the same residual code, they cannot be distinguished from one another, as in the lower-right-hand part of the table. For example, the failure conditions with the same residual code "F' in Table I1 cannot be distinguished from one another, because one of the possible failure conditions may occur as follows:
1) all sensors have failed, 2) all actuators have failed, and 3) any sensor and any actuator have failed at the same time. In this case, the corresponding failure conditions are not identifiable merely by applying the present hexadecimal decision table. Unless a priori knowledge of all failures occurring in the same sector is provided, as in conditions 1) and 2), and the failures can be identified by directly examining the residual outputs. An additional sensor should be employed to extract more information about failures, as illustrated in Example 2.
Example 2 (m = 3 and p = 2): When an additional sensor is added to the diagnostic system, the overall scheme is as shown in Fig. 4 and the relationships between failures and residuals are as shown in hexadecimal digits to represent the failure patterns, as shown in Table IV . In this example, more failure conditions can be identified. For instance, if both sensor s3 and actuator a1 have failed at the same time, then the corresponding residual code "1EF' would be expressed as
The percentage of identified failure conditions for the case with one additional sensor is thus increased, as shown by comparing Table IV with Table II . Thus, in this case diagnosis of multiple failures is possible. This result renders useful information about how many extra sensors are required and where to place sensors properly to isolate failure conditions. According to Table IV, only the following failure conditions, all with residual code "IFF," cannot be distinguished from one another: Table IV of   Example 2 into Table V and Table VI. Table V shows the results when the additional sensor s3 is operating normally, and Table VI shows the results when s3 fails. With this additional sensor, the total number of identifiable failure conditions increases from 5 (in Table 11 ) to 10 (in Table V) among 16 possible failure conditions. Even in the worst case, when the additional sensor s3 also fails, the number of identifiable failure conditions in Table VI is the same as that in Table 11 . Altogether, the identifiable rate is increased from 5/16 to 15/32 in this ideal case. Normally, to extract more failure information in a diagnostic system additional sensors are maintained in good condition. Therefore, we conclude that for this two-in-two-out system, the percentage of identifiable failures increases from 5/16 to 5/8 if an additional sensor is used. This result justifies the claim that adding a sensor to the system will enhance its performance in isolating simultaneous sensor and actuator failures. However, the number of sensors cannot be increased arbitrarily and we must consider the tradeoff between cost and diagnostic performance, and if the sensors are dependent on one another, they may render redundant information. Moreover, because of uncertainty and noise some transfer functions between faults and their residual output may approach zero even when faults occur or may be nonzero even without failure occurrence. The result of the selection of robust threshold is provided in the Appendix.
Iv. SIMULATION RESULTS ON ENGINE SENSORS AND ACTUATORS
The diagnostic scheme developed above is applied here to an automotive engine model to illustrate the scheme's on-line fault detection and isolation functions. According to In this case, we obtain the residual output signals, as shown in Fig. 5 , simply by using a unit matrix as the residual map.
Clearly, the signals exhibit the same information as the true failure conditions and thus all sensor failures can be isolated by examining the residuals directly. 
Case 2 Multiple Actuator Failures:
Similarly, decoupled residuals for multiple actuator failures can be obtained when all failures occur in the actuators. For simulation, we assume that even the actuator a2 of the external load will fail in the in-house diagnosis at k = 20 with a bias of -2 and actuator a1 of the throttle angle fails at k = 40 with a bias of +l. Since the propagation of faults from actuators to residuals through the engine system causes the time lag, we design the residual generators for the actuator with poles all at 0.1, and the residual output signals are obtained as shown in Fig. 6 . Also, the residuals exhibit the same information as the true failure conditions. Therefore, all multiple actuator faults can again be isolated by examining the residuals directly.
In the following two cases, multiple faults occur in both sensors and actuators simultaneously, further decision logic is required, and we apply the proposed hexadecimal decision table.
Case 3 Multiple Sensor and Actuator Failures
In this case, we adopt the same residual maps as in the above two cases for sensors and actuators separately. When actuator a1 fails at k = 20 with a bias of +1 and sensor s2 fails at k = 40 with a bias of -1, the residual outputs as shown in Fig. 7(a)-(b) which are affected by both failures cannot be directly used to isolate the fault sources. Therefore, the cause- effect table and hexadecimal decision table presented in Tables  I and 11 are then used. When the proposed decision technique is applied, the residual code in the diagnostic procedure changes from "0" to "E' when k > 20 and from " E to "F' after k > 40, as shown in Fig. 7(c) . These diagnostic results are justified by the true failure conditions. However, when simultaneous failures occur in this case, the code "F' cannot identify the exact failure pattern. Therefore, the diagnosis performance must be improved by implementing another sensor to acquire more failure information, as discussed in the next case. "IFB": a1 and s2 faults). FOR CASE 4   TABLE VIII  HEXADECIMAL DECISION TABLE FOR We then redesign the residual generators with the same dynamics as in the above cases. Due to some zero transfer metrics between the faults and residuals, we reconstruct the causeeffect table and a hexadecimal decision table as shown in  Tables VI1 and VIII . Consider the same failure conditions as in Case 3, where the residual code changes from "OOO" to "1EA" when IC > 20 and from "IEA' to "1FB" after IC > 40, as shown in Fig. 8 . Clearly, multiple failures are isolated properly according to their true failure conditions. Also note that the results of this case are slightly different from those of the ideal case discussed in Example 2, with reference to Tables I11 and IV. Two sets of failure conditions, with residual codes "1B5" and "IFF," cannot be distinguished exactly in Table  VIII , because three sets of residuals that are nearly zero appear in Table VI1 even when failures occur. As a result, their failure conditions are difficult to identify under noise contamination. 
TABLE VII CAUSE-EFFECT TABLE
The tested operating conditions where the sampling period 0.04 s were as follows engine speed 1500 rpm, manifold pressure 620 mm-Hg, throttle angle position external load torque 64.5 Nt-m. 
F
When the external load was maintained as constant and the throttle angle position varied as shown in Fig. 9(a) , the simulation responses of MAP and speed, as shown in Figs. 9(b) and (c), respectively, were in good agreement with the experimental results. Therefore, the present linearized model is adequate for diagnostic design when the engine is operated around the predetermined conditions. Experimental results on engine diagnosis of multiple actuator and sensor failures are discussed as below. Case 6 Multiple Sensor and Actuator Failures ( m = p = 2): Faults were invoked for the actuator of the throttle angle a1 at k = 40 with a bias of 10 (%max. opening) and for the MAP sensor s1 at k = 80 with a bias of 120 (mm-Hg). As shown in Fig. ll(a) and (b) , the residual output due to the simultaneous faults cannot be used directly to isolate the fault sources. Further decision making via the hexadecimal decision table is thus required. In this case we construct the hexadecimal decision table as shown in Table IX . As shown in Fig. ll(c) , the residual code in the on-line diagnosis changes from " 0 to "E' when k > 40 and from "E' to "F' after k > 80. According to as in Case 6, the residual code in the diagnostic procedures changes from "000' to "1EA" when IC > 40 and from "IEA" to "1FE" after IC > 80, as shown in Fig. 12 . Under the assumption that the additional sensor is functioning normally, the present identified fault conditions indeed correspond to the true multiple failure conditions. Compared with the simulation results in Example 2, the experimental results indicate that diagnostic system identifies fewer failure patterns in real applications than in ideal cases, because some cause-effect elements are either nearly zero or are contaminated by noise and system uncertainty even without failure occurrence.
VI. LIMITATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS
The simulation and experimental results presented above confirm the applicability of the present approach to diagnosing sensor and actuator failures. However, in real applications, the present approach has unavoidable limitations and possible improvements to the present approach are discussed below.
1) The present approach is based on a linearized model of an automotive engine as shown in (37). Although experimental results on model verification have proven the validity of the present model, the operating conditions of the engine system must be close to the predetermined conditions for the model to remain valid. Moreover, 0 noise contamination and system uncertainty, as well as the zero transfer matrices in some modes of the system, degrade the performance of the present diagnostic design seriously, as shown in the experimental results. Therefore, robust residual dynamics and thresholds must be specified in the real diagnostic design.
2) The present approach is suitable for in-house engine diagnosis with all measurements of model variables. However, the external load torque is not a real actuator and is unmeasurable in real applications. Therefore, a special form of residual generators, an unknown input fault detection observer (UIFDO) that decouples the external load from the residual outputs, is needed for on-road diagnosis [21] . When a car is either idling or cruising, the external load maintains a constant value. Under such circumstances, the loading torque can be predicted so that the present approach is still valid for on-road testing. 3) Since the cause-effect table is constructed without redundancy, as shown in Tables I and 111 , simplification of the present scheme can be achieved only if partial failure patterns are identified. On the other hand, an additional sensor is required to improve the identifiable failure rate, especially in the case of simultaneous sensor and actuator failures. In practice, the improvement obtained by implementing more sensors is limited, because extra sensors may render redundant information and some physical variables are difficult to measure directly. 4) Basically, the present residual generators are effective in cases of additive faults. To identify multiplicative faults and to evaluate their exact size, system parameter estimation is a more appropriate method [22] . Furthermore, diagnosis of engine components is also important. Therefore, for the overall engine diagnosis, it is crucial to develop more effective approaches that incorporate both the state and parameter estimation methods. that
ri(s) = H i ( s ) e ( s ) ,
for z = 1 , 2 , . . . ,q.
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VII. CONCLUSION This paper introduces a diagnostic system to achieve detection and isolation of multiple sensor and actuator failures in automotive engines. We have proposed a general scheme of residual generators to construct a hexadecimal decision table for identifying all possible failure patterns in residual codes. Both simulation and experimental results indicate that the proposed diagnostic system not only can be applied to cases where all failures occur in the same sector, but is also appropriate for isolating multiple failures occumng simultaneously in sensors and actuators. Diagnostic results on automotive engine sensors and actuators verify the feasibility of the proposed approach.
APPENDIX
To determine robust threshold, it is assumed that the modeling error is in the multiplicative form as Gu = ( I + A)G,.
Moreover, assume that the modeling error, actuator noise w, and sensor noise n are bounded and the upper bound of each is known, as follows: Consequently, we can determine the robust fault isolation threshold &hi for the z-th residual as follows [17] : 
